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Abstract
Our notion of normativity appears to combine, in a way difficult
to understand but seemingly familiar from experience, elements
of force and freedom. On the one hand, a normative claim is
thought to have a kind of compelling authority; on the other
hand, if our respecting it is to be an appropriate species of respect,
it must not be coerced, automatic, or trivially guaranteed by defi-
nition. Both Hume and Kant, I argue, looked to aesthetic experi-
ence as a convincing example exhibiting this marriage of force
and freedom, as well as showing how our judgment can come to
be properly attuned to the features that constitute value. This
image of attunement carries over into their respective accounts of
moral judgment. The seemingly radical difference between their
moral theories may be traceable not to a different conception of
normativity, but to a difference in their empirical psychological
theories – a difference we can readily spot in their accounts of
aesthetics.
Introduction
‘Normativity’ is, for better or worse, the chief term we philoso-
phers seem to have settled upon for discussing some central but
deeply puzzling phenomena of human life.  We use it to mark a
distinction, not between the good and the bad (or between the
right and the wrong, the correct and the incorrect), but rather
between the good-or-bad (or right-or-wrong, . . .), on the one
hand, and the actual, possible, or usual, on the other. Ethics, aes-
thetics, epistemology, rationality, semantics – all these areas of
philosophical inquiry draw us into a discussion of normativity.
And they do so not because we philosophers import this notion
into our inquiries, but because – sometimes rather belatedly – we
discover it there whether we went looking for it or not. 
I said ‘for better or worse’ because, while it is useful to bring
these various normative phenomena together, the term ‘normativ-
ity’ itself bears the stamp of but one aspect of such phenomena:
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norms – rules or standards. The etymology of the English term
norm traces it back to the Latin norma, a builder’s square. The
term rule also seems to come to us from the building trade – it
descends from the Latin regulus, a straight-edge or ruler. Now
anyone who has sawn a board or chiseled a stone recognizes what
it is to take a square or a ruler as a guide in cutting, and thus to
treat gaps between the actual cut and the square or ruler to show
there is something to be “corrected” in the cut rather than the
tool. So we have here a seemingly concrete example of “action-
guidingness” and an associated “standard of correctness”, differ-
ent from the merely actual, at work.1
Because the norma (or regulus) is a tool whose application is so
transparent to us, it can prove a useful example. But there is a
danger as well as an aptness in using such a model when we
attempt to construct a philosophical account of normativity. A
builder can consult his norma to guide himself in making cuts and
to judge whether his work “measures up”, but does this tool, or
any tool, tell him why or when his cuts should measure up to the
norma? In most cases it is of course evident why they should, and
there certainly is no mystery why the builder’s square is ubiqui-
tious in the building trade. But what if an arch is needed, or a
compound curve – is it still the case that cuts are always to be made
following the norma?
Understanding how a norma or a norm could possess legiti-
mate regulative standing thus also requires us to ask:  What is it
in general for a rule or standard to apply? There is no special dif-
ficulty about saying what it is for a rule to apply in (what we might
call) a “formal” sense. A norma can be applied to a cut and we can
find the cut to fit or not. But in this sense the norma applies even
when we needed to cut a curve. So when do we say a rule applies
or is in force in the sense that it is to be followed? Clearly, we have
simply re-encountered the question of action-guidingness, now in
the form of a distinction between “formal” and (and what we
might call) “normative” applicability. If at this point we ask for
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1 Moreover, we have an equally concrete way of illustrating part of what Kant had in
mind in insisting that the normative is a priori. A norma (or regulus) has its form “before
the fact”, giving the builder a “standard of correctness” for the cut, but not staking a claim
as to how the cut will in fact be made. His subsequent cutting performance is “guided” but
not “predicted” by it, so actual failure on his part to conform to the norma does not
impugn or discredit the norma a posteriori. For further discussion of these examples, and
their relation to the a priori status of norms and rules, see P. Railton, “A Priori Rules:
Wittgenstein on the Normativity of Logic”, forthcoming.
another rule, a “rule of application”, the threat of regress
emerges at once – for how to distinguish those cases in which the
rule of application itself normatively applies among those in
which it merely formally applies? 
We could block the regress if there were a super-rule (rational-
ity?) that always normatively applies and that directs us regarding
the applicability of all other rules. Unfortunately, however, the
useful transparency of anything like the norma – or of such famil-
iar examples as rules of a game – is lost once we speak of super-
rules. For we can intelligibly ask when to use the norma – or when
to play a game – and why. But somehow, a super-rule is supposed
to prevent such questions about itself from arising. Even as strong
a proponent of rules and rationality as Kant seemed able to see
the sense of asking what might be “the purpose of nature in
attaching reason to our will as its governor” (G 305).2 This is a
question about the normative applicability of “rules of reason”, that
is, a question about the source of reason’s normative authority. 
Normative authority
Authority is an impressive thing. At least, it is when it works. We
speak of rules binding us, or being in force, even when we would
rather not comply. This suggests a certain image of what it would
be to explain or ground normative authority. But though sheer
force is sometimes called upon to enforce norms, but it is not
much of a model of the “coercive power” of norms as such.
Rousseau noted that “If force compels obedience, there is no
need to invoke a duty to obey”.3 A sufficiently great actual force
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Penguin, 1968), Bk. I, ch. 3, p. 53.
simply is irresistible. Familiar rules and oughts, even stringent
ones, are not like that – we can and do resist them, as Kant noted:
The moral law is holy (inviolable). Man is certainly unholy
enough, but humanity in his person must be holy to him.
[CPrR 87] 
Clearly the must here is not the must of something irresistible –
the moral law is normatively, not actually, “inviolable”. Since an
ought is to apply to us even when we fall short, its force (and
recognition thereof) must leave that option open. If “guidance by
norms” is to play a nontrivial role in the explaining the an indi-
vidual’s or group’s behavior, then the normative domain must be
a domain of freedom as well as “bindingness”.
This need for a “possibility of incorrectness” is often remarked
upon in philosophical discussions of normativity, usually in con-
nection with physical or causal possibility. But it is no less impor-
tant to make room for the logical or conceptual possibility of error.
It is sometimes said, for example, that a free agent is by definition
guided by rationality or a good will. There is no objection to this
kind of definition as such, but it does not capture the sense of
‘freedom’ we need here. 
Consider a more mundane example. Suppose that I have writ-
ten you a letter and have spelled ‘correspondence’ correctly,
rather than as the often-seen ‘correspondance’. You, the reader,
aware that my spelling is at best uncertain, remark upon my
unexpected success to a colleague and wonder aloud whether it
was accident or competence. You are, in effect, assessing two
explanations, according to one of which I spelled it with an ‘e’ by
chance, while according to the other I did it on purpose (though
perhaps without explicit deliberation) – as a manifestation of my
internalization of, and deference to, this particular norm of
English spelling. Suppose your friend replies, “No, there simply
is no question of why Railton spelled ‘correspondence’ with an
‘e’. Spelling is a normative concept – acts of spelling constitutive-
ly involve satisfying the norms of spelling. So he couldn’t have
spelled the word with an ‘a’ – to have written ‘correspondance’
wouldn’t have counted as a spelling of ‘correspondence’ at all.”  
Now there certainly is a “normative sense” of spelling, accord-
ing to which ‘correspondance’ cannot count as a spelling of ‘cor-
respondence’. In this sense, it is analytic that spelling is correct,
and even losers in spelling bees never spell incorrectly. That’s
why, though it may sound odd to say so, when we ask why or how
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someone spelled correctly we typically are not using the term in
this “normative sense”. As you intended your question to your
colleague, my spelling ‘correspondence’ with an ‘e’ was either a
happy accident or a pleasant surprise, not an analytic truth. 
If a normative must is to have a distinctive place in the world,
then, it cannot be the must either of natural law or of conceptual
necessity. Natural law and conceptual necessities are “always at
work”, even when we’re tired, weak-willed, lazy, disobedient, evil,
or ignorant. No worry about anyone violating them. But norma-
tive guidance requires some contribution on our part, in a
domain where freedom in the “non-normative” sense makes
some vigilance or effort necessary.  
However, having escaped the danger of missing the phenome-
non of normative guidance altogether by assimilating it to a kind
of unfreedom, we had better be careful not to think of it as sim-
ply a matter of free willing. First, many of the attitudes (and asso-
ciated motives and emotions) basic to normative conduct – atti-
tudes of belief, desire, admiration, regret, approval, anger, and so
on – appear not to be wholly within the scope of direct willing.4
Kant, for example, distinguishes attitudes of love and reverence
(reverentia), which are not directly subject to the will and cannot
strictly be objects of duty (MM 401–403), from attitudes that
accord to others a respectful observance (observantia) of their
rights or goals, which can be required of us as a duty (MM 449,
467–468; compare G 399).5 Kant does not conclude that attitudes
of the first sort are therefore irrelevant to the domain of norma-
tive governance – on the contrary, according to the interpreta-
tion to be discussed below, they are to be found at the very bot-
tom of his view, as a source or “basis” of duties (cf. MM 402–403).
Second, even if we restrict attention to those areas of norma-
tive governance in which the will seemingly can be effective – in
selecting among acts, in regulating the more voluntary attitudes
(such as acceptance or acknowledgement), and in shaping indi-
rectly over time the less voluntary attitudes and motives (such as
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will, but it is one thing to form a belief or feel an emotion, and another to form a judg-
ment of it. Although our judgment is supposed to guide our belief, our beliefs might in
fact prove recalcitrant. Thus we say: judgment is normative for attitudes like belief or feel-
ings like appreciation. For a seminal discussion of evaluation as normative for attitudes,
see Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1993), ch. 2.
5 I am grateful to Peter Vranas for bringing to my attention this discussion in Kant
of reverentia vs. observantia.
esteem, reverence, or liking) – it seems we cannot capture all of
normative guidance with the notion of freely willing. For though
the will may guide us, what guides the will? If we say, simply, “We
do – we exercise our normative freedom and choose”, this
appears to get at only half the truth. For what makes an exercise
of will a choice, rather than a mere fiat? And what would make a
choice a moral one – or a rational, aesthetic, prudential, or epis-
temic one? Could the bare fact that a will is my will make it (say)
a good will?
Reason and normativity
Kant tells us that reason’s “highest practical function” is to enable
us to discover and “establish” the good will (G 396), but speaking
of reason and rationality can be ambiguous, at least in ordinary
discourse. Let us distinguish, roughly, two senses of ‘rational
choice’.
In the first sense, a rational choice is a well-reasoned choice, one
that is (or, perhaps, could in principle be) supported by a chain
of deliberation in accord with norms of good reasoning. In the
second sense, a rational choice is a choice appropriately responsive
to reasons, whether or not it is (or, perhaps, even could in princi-
ple be) supported by such deliberation. 
A simple example might help here. Consider a circumstance
in which it would be best to pick an option from among those
saliently available, rather than to deliberate – perhaps time is
short, or perhaps the question is of little significance. To be
“appropriately responsive to reasons” would involve prompt and
decisive selection of one option and moving on. If we were even
to stop and deliberate about whether to deliberate, we might miss
our chance, or waste valuable time. In such cases, the two senses
of ‘rational choice’ come apart in practice.
Yet we might hold that this represents no deep ambiguity in
our basic thinking about practical rationality. For it seems we
could, in principle, in a restrospective “context of justification”,
give a well-reasoned argument in favor of selecting without delib-
eration in certain circumstances. Indeed, it is not uncommon to
find philosophers supposing that the two senses of ‘rational
choice’ always come to the same thing, at least once we under-
stand “well-reasoned” in terms of an in-principle constructable
argument in the context of justification rather than a piece of
actual cogitation in heat of the moment. And in this coming
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together of “well-reasoned” and “responsive to reasons” we might
hope to find the secret to explaining how the free and forceful
elements of normativity can be combined. Perhaps we can under-
stand normative force on the model of appreciating the force of
argument. 
The force of argument has many features that make it an
appealing general model for normative guidance. Unlike an irre-
sistible coercive or natural force, the force of argument is one we
can fail to follow. We have all departed from laws of logic by rea-
soning fallaciously, and we have all had the experience of finding
our actual belief tendencies somewhat recalcitrant in the face of
an argument whose validity and premises we cannot fault. The
connection between the force of argument and belief is a nor-
mative one, rather than a matter of nomic or conceptual necessi-
ty.
At the same time, our response to the force of argument seems
appropriately free without being arbitrarily willful. When we feel
“trapped” by an argument or “caught” in a contradiction, we
want out, but we are not inclined to think that we can, with suffi-
cient power of will or strength of desire, bend the logical rela-
tions and escape. Moreover, even though logical relations thus
stand independent of our will and wishes, recognition of them
does not seem to be at odds with our capacity for autonomy in
thought and belief. Since we take our beliefs to aim at truth and
to be responsive to logic and evidence – one might even say this
sort of commitment is constitutive of belief as an attitude6 – we do
not need to be subject to some further coercion or external sanc-
tion in order for self-acknowledged logical implications to be felt
as putting normative pressure on us. We think we can see respon-
siveness to argument as a form of epistemic attunement of just the
sort belief presents itself as having – attunement to content, to
relations of implication and evidence, and so on. 
“The force of argument” is indeed a central example of the
peculiar mixture of force and freedom that we take normative
guidance to involve. If it were possible to understand all norma-
tive guidance on this model, then we might hope that the two
senses of ‘rational choice’ would never lead to genuinely divided
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loyalty and that we had gotten to the bottom of things normative.
No doubt the lasting appeal of rationalism in philosophy is part-
ly explained by this. 
But I will spend most of the balance of this paper discussing –
in a very preliminary way – some ways in which the force of argu-
ment seems unable to afford a general model of normative guid-
ance, or to take us to the bottom of all things normative. I will
look first at what might seem the most hospitable territory for the
force of argument: epistemology, or reasons for belief. Second, I
will look at another domain of judgment, which might at first
strike us as peripheral but instead emerges as central: aesthetics.
Third, I will consider the classic turf for normativity: morality. 
Normative authority for belief 
We face a problem at the very outset attempting to understand
normative authority in the domains of theoretical or practical
reason in terms of the force of argument. For arguments and the
logical relations they involve operate on, and conclude in, propo-
sitions. But according to a long tradition that seems worth main-
taining, the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning is an
action and the conclusion of a piece of theoretical reasoning is a
belief, and neither a belief nor an action is a proposition. If we
are somehow to connect the propositional conclusion of an argu-
ment to a phenomenon like belief or action, it seems as if some
non-argumentative but nonetheless justifying or “rationalizing”
relationship must be found. Can we do this without already intro-
ducing a species of normative authorization not encompassed by
the power of argument?
This is a contested matter. For example, we are inclined to
speak of sensory experience as paradigmatically justifying per-
ceptual belief, yet it is far from obvious that the content of expe-
rience itself is propositional, or that the justificatory relationship
of this content to perceptual belief can fully be captured in
deductive or inductive relations among propositions. To explore
these questions would take us into deep waters. But perhaps we
can give a less controversial example of justified belief to illus-
trate how difficult it would be to reconstruct all epistemic justifi-
cation propositionally.
So as not to prejudice matters against “propositionalism”, let
us make some favorable assumptions. Suppose that we were able
to give an uncontroversial account of “the force of argument” in
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the inductive case, that is, of what it is for a hypothesis to be
inductively supported to a certain degree by a given body of evi-
dence. And suppose as well that we can state the “rationalizing”
relationship linking justified belief to inductive argument by a
simple formula: a belief that h of strength r is justified in epistemic
context C if h is inductively supported in C to degree r. 
Focus now on beliefs that ascribe self-identity. Some such
beliefs, I trust, are in fact epistemically justified. Can we give an
account of this justification in propositional terms, even under
our favorable assumptions? Perhaps, one might suppose, they are
justified on the basis of an inductive inference from certain
coherences and continuities among one’s experiences. Consider
an argument of the form:
(SI) I have experience e1 at t-3
I have experience e2 at t-2.
I have experience e3 at t-1.
I have experience e4 at t.
Experiences e1–e4 exhibit coherence and continuity.
I therefore conclude (with strength r) that I am self-
identically me throughout the time interval (t-3) to t.  
Yet it is clear that this argument simply presupposes self-identity,
since it is formulated in terms of (a presumably unequivocating)
first-personal ‘I’. Now propositions are essentially third-personal,
so we would have to reformulate the argument replacing ‘I’ and
‘me’ with ‘Peter Railton’. Suppose this done, and suppose there is
no doubt about the truth of the premises or the argument’s induc-
tive legitimacy. We now have a conclusion about Peter Railton, but
it tells me nothing yet about my identity. That is, it does not yet sus-
tain a conclusion licensing a de se self-identity ascription on my
part.7 It does not tell me that ‘Peter Railton’ refers to me. 
If experiential induction, propositionally construed, will not
suffice, where does my sense of self-identity and my entitlement
(if any) to the first-personal ‘I’ come from? Presumably I arrive
at a sense of being me (and here, and now) in part from some-
thing like what has been called proprioceptive aspects of my expe-
rience (both conscious and nonconscious) – a kind of feeling or
expectation that pervades my mental life and which, so far as I
can see, cannot in principle be rendered as a third-personal
328 PETER RAILTON
 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999
7 See David Lewis, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”, in his Philosophical Papers, vol. I
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
propositional content.8 Now, if we dismiss this as no more than
my “sense” of self-identity, and insist that we would need evidence
reconstructable in argumentative form in order to warrant such a
conclusion, we will find ourselves cut off from any possible
avenue of justification. This could leave us stranded as theoreti-
cal reasoners, since without any entitlement to the ‘I’, how am I
ever to be responsive in my belief to the evidence I have? – A lot
of people have a lot of evidence, much of it conflicting, but
whose should weigh with me? To justify my beliefs I need to iden-
tify myself in the space of epistemic reasons.
Hume himself seems to have become sensible of such a defect
in any purely continuity-and-coherence-based approach to per-
sonal identity, such as the one he experimented with in the
Treatise. He reflected in an Appendix:
If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only
by being connected together. But no connexions among
distinct existences are ever discoverable by human under-
standing. We only feel a connexion or determination of the
thought . . . the ideas are felt to be connected together, and
naturally introduce each other. [T 635]9
He is at a loss to describe this feeling, or to explain it as based
upon principles. “[T]his difficulty,” he concedes, “is too hard for
my understanding” [T 636]. 
Just what a fix we could end up in is seen at the end of Part I
of the Treatise, where Hume gives a perhaps inadvertent intima-
tion of the problem his later reflection brought clearly into focus.
NORMATIVE FORCE AND NORMATIVE FREEDOM 329
 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999
8 There is some experimental evidence in the literature on autism that autistic indi-
viduals may experience deficits in developing a feeling for the self, much as individuals
can experience color deficits in ordinary perception. Autistic individuals, for example,
experience difficulty with first- vs. third-person asymmetries in so-called “false belief
tasks”, and are known to lose track of first- and second-personal pronouns in conversa-
tions, as in the phenomenon of “echo-locution”. After reviewing a description of a cogni-
tively very high-functioning autistic individual, Temple Grandin, who herself professes
finding ordinary social language and exchange baffling, but technical or scientific lan-
guage much clearer, Simon Baron-Cohen writes:
And her own explanation . . . ? “She surmises that her mind is lacking in some of the
‘subjectivity,’ the inwardness, that others seem to have.
From Mindblindness (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 142–143.
9 Here are the abbreviations used in the text for Hume’s writings: Inq = Inquiry
Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by C. W. Hendel (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957);
T = Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1888); ST = “Of the Standard of Taste”, in Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays by David
Hume, ed. by John W. Lenz (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).
Hume is describing the depths of the mental distress he reaches
as a result of an “intense” commitment to following the rationalis-
tic maxim to restrict belief to those matters where we can give a
reasoned justification. He finds that, as a result, he loses any enti-
tlement to confidence in induction, memory, external body, or
even deduction. Eventually he “can look upon no opinion even
as more probable or likely than another”, and calls out in des-
peration, “Where I am I, or what?” (T 269). Rigorous adherence
to the self-imposed rationalist maxim prevents him from attibut-
ing any epistemic authority to his “natural introduction” to the
self via an unreasoned “feeling” of it – and he thus loses his grip
on self-location and self-identity. 
Having seen what it would be to reach this point, Hume can-
not convince himself that epistemology would be well-served by
unqualified obedience to the rationalistic maxim. Why is it, he
wonders, that
. . . I must torture my brain . . . at the very time I cannot satisfy
myself concerning the reasonableness of so painful an appli-
cation, nor have any tolerable prospect of arriving by its means
at truth or certainty? Under what obligation do I lie . . . ? [T
270] 
Hume remains concerned with reasonableness, truth, and
probability. He is, however, “sceptical” that trusting only the
force of argument will enable us to be fully responsive to these
concerns.
. . . understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its
most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not
the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in
philosophy or in common life. . . . I am ready to reject all belief
and reasoning . . . . Whose favor shall I court, and whose anger
must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I
any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am
confounded . . . and begin to fancy myself . . . utterly depriv’d
of the use of every member and faculty. [T 268–269] 
Far from consolidating belief around a core of rational certainty
like the Cartesian cogito, Hume finds himself in a complete col-
lapse of normative epistemic guidance – there remains no dis-
cernment concerning evidence or probability, no sense of any-
one’s authority, even one’s own. His “distribution of credence”
has become entirely undiscriminating, even with respect to logi-
330 PETER RAILTON
 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999
cal relations and “the force of argument”. How, for example, are
we to reason in the “context of justification” about the relation-
ship between our beliefs and their grounds if we accord immedi-
ate experience no prima facie authority to support belief even con-
cerning the content of our own thoughts?
If belief and reasoning are to be resurrected, we will need to
authorize ourselves to draw directly upon a wider base of epis-
temic resources, without asking for reconstructability as argu-
ment, even in the context of justification. But what to add? Belief,
we’ve noticed, is not a bare proposition, but an attitude toward
propositions. Hume puts it starkly: “belief is nothing but a peculiar
feeling, different from the simple conception [of its object]” (T 624). If
we consider de se belief, Hume’s suggestion would seem to be that
this attitude is a feeling that is to be regulated (at least in part) by
“self-introducing” (we might say “self-intimating”) feelings. A
feeling regulating a feeling? Hume writes that “belief is more prop-
erly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures” [T
181]. Hume appears to apply this idea well beyond self-identify-
ing belief, stressing the role of feelings in shaping belief con-
cerning external objects, and observing:
Nature has . . . doubtless esteem’d it an affair of too great
importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and
speculations. [T 187]
But what is such regulation of feeling by feeling like, and, if it
cannot be reconstructed as a argument, how can it constitute
justification? It seems we will need to supplement the normative
“force of argument” in epistemology with something like a nor-
mative “force of feeling”, if we are to resuscitate epistemic dis-
crimination or even self-discernment. How can feeling be
appropriately discerning to possess epistemic authority? To
have some idea of how this might go, we will turn to another
work of Hume’s – on discerning, knowing, appreciative feel-
ings.
Normative authority and appreciation
We encounter a structurally similar problem – of how to find the
resources necessary to support a domain of appropriate discrim-
ination in judgment – in Hume’s late essay, “Of the Standard of
Taste”, which apparently is a survival of a systematic project he
had undertaken on the nature of “criticism”, to include morality
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as well.10 After observing that we cannot ground aesthetic distinc-
tions on “reasonings a priori” (ST 231), he begins to consider the
possible contribution of sentiment. Yet he quickly finds that mere
acquiescence in sentiment would equally leave aesthetic distinc-
tions groundless:
There is a species of philosophy, which cuts off all hopes of
success in such an attempt, and represents the impossibility of
ever attaining any standard of taste. The difference, it is said,
is very wide between judgment and sentiment. All sentiment is
right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond
itself . . . . . . . [E]very individual [therefore] ought to acquiesce
in his own sentiment, without pretending to regulate those of
others. . . . [And thus it is] fruitless to dispute concerning
tastes. [ST 230]
This species of philosophy has the wholly “sceptical” result that
we cannot even say that Milton is better than Ogilby, and any
such philosophy effectively undermines the discrimination upon
which taste must be based. Agreeable as this “levelling” sort of
skepticism may be to some strands of common sense, common
sense on the whole, Hume notes, does not really take it to heart:
Whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance
between OGILBY and MILTON, or BUNYAN and ADDISON,
would be thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if we
had maintained a mole-hill to be as high as TENERIFE, or a
pond as extensive as the ocean. Though there may be found
persons, who give preference to the former authors; no one
pays attention to such a taste; and we pronounce without scru-
ple the sentiment of these pretended critics to be absurd and
ridiculous. [ST 230–231]
Hume isn’t personally threatened by a “species of philosophy”
that would forced us to give up aesthetic distinctions. “The prin-
ciple of natural equality of tastes”, he believes, can hold sway only
in disputatious or esoteric settings where we are not actively rely-
ing upon taste to guide us. In ordinary life, it is “totally forgot”
(ST 231). Unlike the younger Hume, who wrestled nearly to the
point of exhaustion with reason’s normative force, worrying
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tion, The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.
27.
aloud “For my part, I know not what ought to be done” (T 268),
the older Hume who wrote “Of the Standard of Taste” seems con-
fident that he knows reason’s place and unfraid of the world of
normative discrimination tumbling into ruin around him. Any
aesthetician – rationalist or sentimentalist – who cannot find a
basis for distinguishing a Milton from an Ogilby will simply find
himself without authority in Hume’s eyes, or ours. 
To whose taste, then, do we actually pay some attention, i.e.,
attribute some normative force, and why would this count as
authority about beauty? Hume identifies two sources of authority,
convergence of “expert opinion” among those with relevant
knowledge and sensory discriminative capacities, and conver-
gence of general, experienced opinion in the “test of time”. In
both cases, we are seen to accord some authority to these sources,
beyond our own simple likings. After all, we know that our own
simple likings, convincing though they may be as feelings of
attraction, may nonetheless be attributable to our own partiality,
ignorance, fashion, novelty, lack of sensory discrimination, or dis-
taste for (or perverse fascination with) the odd or déclassé. Why
should this matter – isn’t it up to us what we like? Yes, but when
we judge beauty, we attribute something to an object or event,
not merely to ourselves; and we accord ourselves authority con-
cerning it. Partiality, fashion, lack of sensory discrimination, etc.,
are all ways in which the pleasure one takes in the experience of
a landscape or of a work of art might simply be unrelated to the
“beauties” (in Hume’s terminology) it possesses – since we do not
think self-interest, fashion, and the like are, or “make for”, gen-
uine beauty. 
Well then, what sorts of features do we uncontroversially take
to have a constitutive role in beauty-making, in both natural and
man-made objects? Where do we expect to find the “beauties”?
Surely, if there is anything at all to our notion of beauty, then
among these features are: form, proportion, color, texture, com-
position, melody, harmony, rhythm, progression, and the like.
When these features of an object are of a kind that our sensory
and cognitive engagement with them seems reliably to yield expe-
riences we find intrinsically enjoyable, we seem to have (to that
extent) a candidate for beauty. That such features do figure in
our assessments of beauty is reflected in ways we typically
attribute lesser or greater aesthetic authority to our own likings
or the likings of others. For example, I do not take my likings
concerning Middle Eastern music to have much authority – I am
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inexperienced with it, unable to discern its shades of tonality,
structures, progressions, or variety (the different pieces sound
too much alike to me), I don’t claim to be exercising taste or dis-
cernment in when I express sporadic likes and dislikes of what I
happen to hear. And I certainly claim no authority over others.
By contrast, there are those whose likings in Middle Eastern
music I find much more authoritative than mine, and whom I
would consult for guidance. Now someone I take to be expert
could lose some standing in my eyes if I came to learn that he
plays favourites, judges music by its ideological content, lacks sen-
sory discernment, or cannot find other individuals seriously
engaged in making or judging such music who take his judgment
seriously. Our practices – including our patterns of normative
deference – reveal that we do have some idea of what it would be
for a feeling (an appreciative delight) to be more or less attuned
to objective, beauty-making features of objects, even though this
attunement is effected in part via careful cultivation of, and atten-
tion to, subjective feelings or sensations. 
A degree of deference to experts who possess demonstrable
skills of discernment, greater knowledge of genre or context,
wider experience, and so on, enables me to extend my “critical”
power in detecting beauty-making features – they help me form
a better idea of what I’d find delightful were I to gain greater
experience. As a result, they help attune me to the “beauties” of
objects, features which can be rich and lasting sources of sensori-
ly-based, cognitively-engaging delight. Hume puts it thus:
Those finer emotions of the mind are of a very tender and deli-
cate nature, and require the concurrence of many favourable
circumstances to make them play with facility and exactness,
according to their general and established principles. The
least exterior hindrance to such small springs, or the least
internal disorder . . . and we shall be unable to judge of the
catholic and universal beauty. The relation, which nature has
placed between the form and the sentiment, will at least be
more obscure; and it will require greater accuracy to trace and
discern it. [ST 232–233]
A similar sort of authority, also related to an authority we
already accord ourselves, attaches to the “test of time”. Hume
writes, concerning the relation “nature has put between form
and sentiment” which underlies beauty:
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We shall be able to ascertain its influence not so much from
the operation of each particular beauty, as from the durable
admiration, which attends those works, that have survived all
the caprices of mode and fashion, all the mistakes of ignorance
and envy.
The same HOMER, who pleased at ATHENS and ROME
two thousand years ago, is still admired at PARIS and at
LONDON. All the changes of climate, government, religion,
and language, have not been able to obscure his glory. [ST
233]
Long exposure, developed sensibilities, the authority of countless
experiences on the part of different individuals – how far we are
from my inexperienced self overhearing a snatch of Middle
Eastern music at lunch and saying “Hmm, don’t care much for
that”. It is natural to see this as a difference in attunement to
musical value. 
Over the course of a life, we participate in a complex critical
and appreciative practice, attributing some authority to our own
growing experience (“In the end, the proof of the pudding . . .”),
making recommendations and seeking confirmation in the opin-
ions of others (“Try it, you’ll see for yourself”), and also showing
some deference to various external sources of authority (“After
what I’ve heard about it, I’m eager to try this place“). Situated
within such a practice, which extends across societies and times
and is held together both by our fundamental human sensory
and cognitive similarities and by our reciprocal deferences, my
judgments of beauty have at least a chance to be “normed by” the
sources of aesthetic value, and words like ‘beautiful’ in my mouth
have a chance of expressing genuinely aesthetic evaluations, even
when I get things wrong.11 We manage, that is, to have a domain
of real distinctions concerning beauty, a domain of genuine taste,
even though “subjective feelings” play an essential role in its
shape. 
Kant was also concerned to underwrite the possibility of objec-
tivity in the domain of taste. Like Hume, he worried about vari-
ous ways in which appreciation might be attuned or disattuned to
genuine value. Kant writes:
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11 A common standard of time and shared conventions about when to arrive for (say)
a noon engagement make it possible for me to be on time, but also late. In the case of good
– and bad – taste, something more than this conventional infrastructure is required, e.g.,
Hume’s account of beauties to be attuned to.
. . . everyone says: Hunger is the best sauce; [but] to people
with a healthy appetite anything is tasty provided it is edible.
Hence if people have a liking of this sort, that does not prove
that they are selecting by taste. Only when their need has been
satisfied can we tell who in a multitude of people has taste and
who does not. [CJ 210]
Hunger makes our likings unreliable. But when, for Kant, could
a subjective condition such as liking be a reliable guide to a pur-
portedly objective matter, such as aesthetic value? 
Kant could not pursue Hume’s solution, of looking to the
refinement and qualification of empirical faculties and senti-
ments. Hume’s psychology attributes to “the internal frame and
constitution of the mind” appetites and passions that are directly
aimed at features of the world independent of the self, and are
“antecedent” to self-interest or happiness (Inq 113–119).  But in
Kant’s empirical psychology, by contrast, appetites and passions
are always guided at base by one’s own pleasure:
All the inclinations together (which can be brought into a tol-
erable system and the satisfaction of which is then called one’s
happiness) constitute regard for oneself (solipsismus). [CPrRm
73]12
Within such a psychology, to become ever more delicately
attuned to nuance in one’s empirical feelings would simply be to
become ever more attentive to promoting personal pleasure,
regardless of how the pleasure is produced, whether any appre-
ciative or cognitive faculties are engaged, and whatever the
nature of the cause of the pleasure.  Pleasure and affect are in
this sense “blind” for Kant (CJ 272), since “if our sole aim were
enjoyment, it would be foolish to be scrupulous about the means
of getting it” (CJ 208). An Oriental massage in which the joints
and muscles are agreeably “squeezed and bent” would be lumped
together with a stirring Greek tragedy (CJ 274).
In aesthetics, we must focus not on which phenomena pro-
duce the greatest or most intense pleasure, but rather on the
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12 We can see an analogy with the case of theoretical reason. If we thought that all
inclination to believe was essentially self-regarding (solipsismus), and attuned to gratification
rather than objective conditions, truth, or evidence, then we would find genuine “epis-
temic worth” only in a dutiful capacity to resist epistemic inclination and regulate belief
by epistemic principle alone. This would not make “epistemic dutifulness” into the “high-
est end” of epistemic activity – that would remain the marriage of justified belief with truth
that constitutes knowledge – , but into an indispensable condition of it. 
“presentation” of objects to the senses: we must be able to see the
object “as poets do”, and “must base our judgment regarding it
merely on how we see it” (CJ 270), that is, on the genuinely beau-
ty-making characteristics. Self-oriented and pleasure-seeking, our
empirical sentiments are careless as to modality. Kant thus fore-
told the fate that awaited aesthetics in the hands of that
redoubtably thorough-going proponent of egoistic hedonism,
Bentham: the only ground of discrimination would be quantity,
the “mass of agreeable sensation” (CJ 266) – and pushpin (or
Oriental massage) would indeed be deemed as good as poetry. 
Moreover, Kant joined Hume in insisting that aesthetic judg-
ments purport to be “non-personal” and communicable to others
– in the sense not only of informing others concerning what we
like, but of recommending, where each of us purports to have
potential authority for others. “But,” Kant argues,
if we suppose that our liking for the object consists merely in
the object’s gratifying us through charm or emotion, then we
also must not require anyone else to assent to an aesthetic judg-
ment we make; for that sort of liking each person rightly con-
sults only his private sense. [CJ 278] 
For similar reasons, Kant insists that in order to ensure that our
account is “concerned solely with aesthetic judgments”, “we must
not take for our examples such beautiful or sublime objects of
nature as presuppose the concept of a purpose” (CJ 269–270). To
the extent that the force of an example can be attributed to pur-
pose (e.g., self-interest), the judgment will not be aesthetically
attuned – we might substitute for the object of appreciation any-
thing that would bring about the sought-after result equally well.
. . . the purposiveness would be either teleological, and hence
not aesthetic, or else be based on mere sensations of an object
(gratification or pain) and hence not merely formal. [CJ 270]
Therefore:
It seems, then, that we must not regard a judgment of taste as
egoistic . . . we must acknowledge it to be a judgment that is enti-
tled to a claim that everyone else ought also to agree with it.
But if that is so, then it must be based on some a priori princi-
ple (whether objective or subjective) . . . [J]udgments of taste
presuppose such a command, because they insist that our lik-
ing be connected directly with a presentation. [CJ 278]
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If our judgment is to be attuned to the sources of aesthetic value
by a “liking” that is “connected directly with a presentation”, but
empirical likings cannot do this, where then is taste’s infrastruc-
ture, where to turn for regulation of our feeling of appreciation
– for Kant insists that appreciation, even of the beautiful and the
good, is a liking, a feeling (CJ 210)? 
Kant looks to reason. The seeming peculiarity of Kant’s aes-
thetic, that it sees aesthetic judgments as “demands of reason”,
can be understood in this light. But we must be careful, for such
demands of reason are not demands based upon argument, rule,
or conceptual demonstration: 
. . . the beautiful must not be estimated according to concepts,
but by the final mode in which the imagination is attuned so as
to accord with the faculty of concepts generally; and so rule
and precept are incapable as serving as the requisite subjective
standard for that aesthetic and unconditioned finality in fine
art which has to make a warranted claim to being bound to
please. Rather must such a standard be sought in the element
of mere nature of the Subject, which cannot be comprehend-
ed under rules or concepts, that is to say, the supersensible sub-
strate of all the Subject’s faculties (unattainable by any concept
of understanding) . . . . [CJm 344]
Here, then, we have Kant’s version of the subjective attunement
that affords reliable guidance concerning the beauty-making fea-
tures of the world: the pleasure afforded by activity on the part of
the self’s supersensible substrate, when directly engaging the sen-
sory “presentation” of the object. This substrate, shared as it is by
all rational humanity, helps supply the needed infrastructure for
a domain of objective taste. Now an invocation of a supersensible
substrate may sound like hocus-pocus, but Kant deserves credit
for refusing to be false to the “non-personal” compellingness of
the experience of aesthetic appreciation, in order to satisfy an
allegedly scientific egoistic, hedonist psychology. Not hiding its
“unfathomableness”, Kant gives the best explanation he can: only
the rational self has the requisite formal, disinterested, “nonper-
sonal”, and universal character to be the source of such a plea-
sure.  
But Kant’s rational self is not simply a reasoning self. Beauty is a
“way of presenting” that requires concepts, yet Kant recognizes
that aesthetic appreciation is not simply a matter of being
“brought to concepts” (CJ 266). If we were nothing but “pure
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intelligences”, “we would not present in this way” and could not
see beauty (CJ 270). Nor is the rational self the whole infrastruc-
ture. According to Kant, beauty “holds” – presumably, is capable
of “norming” judgment through feelings of appreciation and the
practice of taste – only for “beings who are animal and yet ratio-
nal, though it is not enough that they be rational” (CJ 210).13
Despite the indispensable role of reason, then, in attuning us
to the beautiful, the normative force of judgments of beauty, even
for a rationalist aesthetic such as Kant’s, is not the force of argu-
ment. We therefore cannot expect that we could reconstruct aes-
thetic justification in propositional terms. As in the case of de se
attitudes, an attitude (in this case, aesthetic appreciation) may
stand in a justified relationship to its proper object even though
this relationship is not mirrored in an argumentative relationship
among propositions. 
In appreciation we find the right mix of force and freedom for
normative guidance. On the one hand, “the liking involved in
our taste for the beautiful is disinterested and free” (CJ 210). On
the other hand, we all know the compelling character of aesthetic
appreciation and good criticism: we find in our first-personal
experience of the object, as informed by the contributions of the
critic, something both likeable and convincing. “Ah, now I see it,”
we think, thereby feeling the force of aesthetic authority: a force
of credible influence from the critic (“He helped me see it”), of
convincing experience from our own case (“Now I get it”), of a
compelling work (“There was a lot more in it than I thought”),
and of a discovery of value that we can share with others (“You
must try this” or “You must read his essay, it’ll change how you
look at Miró”). 
Wittgenstein, in his “Lectures on Aesthetics”, gives as his
model of aesthetic appreciation an example of this process,
drawn from his own case:14
Take the question: “How should poetry be read? What is the
correct way of reading it?” . . . I had an experience with the
18th-century poet Klopstock. I found that the way to read him
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senting”, and so is not available to a pure intelligence (CJ 270). However, he also believes
that our capacity to appreciate the sublime does not depend upon our animal nature.
More on the sublime, below.
14 Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Lectures on Aesthetics”, in Cyrill Barrett (ed.), L.
Wittgenstein: Lectures and Conversations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).
Hereinafter, LA.
was to stress his metre abnormally. Klopstock put ˘ – ˘ (etc.) in
front of his poems. When I read his poems in this new way, I
said, “Ah-ha, now I know why he did this.” What had hap-
pened? I had read this kind of stuff before and had been mod-
erately bored, but when I read it in this particular way, intense-
ly, I smiled, said “This is grand”, etc. But I might not have said
anything. The important fact is that I read it again and again
. . . that I read the poems entirely differently, more intensely,
and said to others: “Look! This is how they should be read.”
[LA, 4–5] 
Kant and Hume agree that, underlying aesthetic evaluation,
there must be some form of “liking” or “enjoyment”. Moreover,
the liking in question must be sensorily-based, cognitively-engag-
ing, discerning, disinterested, and communicable. If Hume is
right, our essentially similar “internal fabric” – our empirical psy-
chology and sentiments – can afford much of the ground for
such a liking, since many of our appetites and passions take exter-
nal conditions or sensory “forms or qualities” as their immediate
objects and are disinterested in character, even though satisfying
them will also yield pleasure. Thanks to additional qualification
of feeling by the influence of reason, understanding, and the
commerce of opinion, we can develop on this psychological
“common ground” a domain of discernment and knowledge,
where we can recognize and possess authority, and ‘beauty’ can
have its true meaning – apart from fashionableness, novelty,
endearing schlock, ponderous “importance”, snobbish over-
refinement, and so on. In Hume’s account, as in Kant’s, what pos-
sesses ultimate aesthetic authority is a qualified appreciative attitude
and not a mere liking. In Hume’s account, as in Kant’s, much of
the qualification of attitude is supplied by reason. And in Hume’s
account, as in Kant’s, it seems we could not reconstruct aesthetic
justification in terms of the force of argument.15
The normative authority of moral rules
Perhaps no one is really tempted by the idea that the normative
force of aesthetic appreciation rests upon argument. But things
might be different in the moral case, where the supremacy of
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reasoning and rules is often invoked. Perhaps in morality at least
we will find it possible to account for normative force in terms of
the force of argument.
Let us set aside for now a very general worry about this line of
thought, briefly touched on in the introduction: any appeal to
rules as a foundation for justification runs the risk of regress or
circularity unless we can appeal to a super-rule of a mysterious
kind. For now let us cheerfully assume that we don’t mind mys-
tery, as long as its name is rationality.
Kant’s moral philosophy is often taken to be the locus classicus for
the idea that normativity resides in rationality itself, and the moral
law it prescribes. Perhaps this is indeed how we should understand
his view: there is a super-rule, and it commands our obedience as a
rational obligation. But is it obvious that this is how he understands
his own most basic approach to normativity? We are told to have
respect (reverentia) for the moral law, but Kant observes:
Respect (reverentia) is, again, something subjective, a feeling of
a special kind, not a judgment about an object that it would be
a duty to bring about or promote. For, such a duty, regarded as
a duty, could be represented to us only through the respect we
have for it. A duty to have respect would thus amount to being
put under obligation to duties . . . . [MM 402–403] 
So it seems we must look for “a feeling of a special kind”, not
obligation, at the bottom of moral duty. What is this feeling like?
Here is an example of the sort of reverential appreciative feeling
Kant appears to have in mind: 
. . . to a humble, plain man, in whom I perceive righteousness
in a higher degree than I am conscious of in myself, my mind
bows whether I choose or not, however high I carry my head
that he may not forget my superior position. . . . Respect is a
tribute we cannot refuse to pay to merit whether we will or not;
we can indeed outwardly withhold it, but we cannot help feel-
ing it inwardly.  [CPrR 76-77; compare G 454] 
What we perceive in this individual is not simply more severe duti-
fulness than our own. We are all familiar with individuals who turn
sensible everyday rules into severe duties that rise above all incli-
nation, but our mind does not bow to that.16 What we perceive,
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according to Kant, is greater righteousness, dutifulness that
“includes” a good will (G 397). 
In our appreciative encounter with it, we once again
encounter the mixture of force and freedom characteristic of
normative force. On the one hand, the respect is “freely paid” –
for Kant, nothing in our experience suggests that any self-inter-
ested incentive or external coercion lies behind our apprecia-
tion. On the other hand, the respect is in a way compelled, it is
something “we cannot help feeling”, even when it comes in the
face of interest. Kant writes:
Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace noth-
ing charming or insinuating but requirest submission and yet
seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that would
arouse natural aversion or terror which of itself finds entrance
into the mind and yet gains reluctant reverence . . . . [CPrR 86] 
Now this impressive paean might suggest an intrinsic evaluation of
duty. But, as Paul Guyer reminds us,17 Kant continues, still
addressing “Duty”:  
. . . what origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to be
found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all
kinship with the inclinations and from which to be descended
is the indispensable condition of the only worth which men
can give themselves? 
It cannot be less than something which elevates man above
himself as a part of the world of sense, something which con-
nects him with an order of things which only the understand-
ing can think and which has under it the whole system of all
ends which alone is suitable to such unconditional practical
laws as the moral. [CPrR 86–87] 
Notice that the practical laws of morality, and even duty itself, are
not self-subsistent sources of unconditional worth – their worth
arises from their “descent”, which does secure the noble standing
of morality.18
At the bottom of morality’s normative authority, then, Kant
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(ed.), Kant and Critique (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), p. 70.
18 Guyer emphasizes the consistency with which Kant, over the course of his philo-
sophical career, recognized that all evaluation presupposes some values-in-their-own-
right. The value Guyer identifies is the special freedom Kant attributes to human agents.
See his “Kant’s Morality of Law and Morality of Freedom”. 
speaks not of an analytic demand of consistency nor a willful
exercise of our capacity to govern ourselves by rules, but of an
experienced synthetic demand and a free acknowledgement, the
subjective expression of which is a feeling of a more aesthetic
character, akin to the demand upon us that the appreciation for
the sublime in nature involves: 
It is in fact difficult to think of a feeling for the sublime in
nature without connecting it with a mental attunement similar
to that for moral feeling. [CJ 128] 
For Kant, as we saw in the aesthetic case, human inclination
and appetite cannot attune us to this sort of demand, because
they are by nature self-interested (“solipsismus”, CPrR 73) rather
than non-personal and distinterested, and thus “human nature
does not of itself harmonize with the good” (CJ 271). Kant there-
fore must find a faculty internal to us, capable of evincing or
guiding a special sort of liking, a “moral feeling”, that is attuned
to the moral-value-making features of the world, the sources of
moral worth. We can, he writes, be attuned to the good “only
through the dominance that reason exerts over sensibility” (CJ
271). So, as in aesthetics, to underwrite a rational demand as
grounded in the right sort of attunement, we must have recourse
to a “supersensible substrate”, a noumenal self. Moral judgments
are akin to aesthetic judgments of sublimity – judgments of beau-
ty draw in part upon our “animal” nature; for the moral and the
sublime, reason alone, the “supersensible substrate”, suffices.
Now for Hume, the “substrate” for moral and aesthetic judg-
ment can be our empirical psychology, since it contains senti-
ments of a suitably “impersonal” and non-self-interested nature.
For example,
We are certain, that sympathy is a very powerful principle in
human nature. We are also certain, that it has a great influence
on the sense of beauty, when we regard external objects, as well
as when we judge of morals. We find, that it has force sufficient
to give us the strongest sentiments of approbation . . . . [T
618]19
Thanks to sympathy, among other sentiments, our sentiment of
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involves two elements: empathy (a direct internal simulation of the circumstances and
mental states of others) and sympathy (a direct positive concern for their well-being). 
direct approval can be attuned to the ends of others as such, and
to the general interest, even when we have no personal interest
at stake: reading ancient history, we wince at a tyrant’s cruelty,
and root for the hero to save the populace from him. And much
aesthetic judgment, likewise, depends upon a capacity to feel the
feelings of others. If well-developed, well-informed, and atten-
tively listened to, such “impersonal” sentiments can attune us to
– “harmonize” us with – the good and the beautiful.
We may observe, that all the circumstances requisite for [sym-
pathy’s] operation are found in most of the virtues; which
have, for the most part, a tendency to the good of society, or to
that of the person possess’d of them. [T 618] 
Sympathy can of course be misled, and may lead us astray. It may
fail to be engaged in unfamiliar or misunderstood surroundings.
Or it may immediately attune us to the evident pain of animal
undergoing an emergency veterinary procedure, making us wish
fervently that the procedure would stop, even though this opera-
tion is necessary for the animal’s survival. Sympathy – like aes-
thetic admiration – therefore must be assisted and qualified by
knowledge, understanding of cause and effect, and reason, and
by participation in a community in which our judgments may be
challenged and improved if (as we tend to do) we launch our
opinions into the public world and also to defer to some degree
to the judgments of others and to social practices hammered into
shape over the generations. Thus – once again, as in the aesthet-
ic case – our feelings can develop greater freedom from preju-
dice, finer discrimination, and closer attunement to genuine
moral distinctions. 
By contrast Kant, as an egoistic hedonist in psychology but a
universal humanist in morality, could no more entrust moral
attunement to “solipsistic” empirical sentiment (cf. CPrR 73) than
he could aesthetic attunement.20 And thus we arrive at Kant’s
answer to the question why nature attached reason to will (which
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is, for Kant, also a liking; CJ 209): without the “substrate” of rea-
son to ground impersonal feelings, we would arrive only at a per-
sonalistic willfulness, not a good (i.e., general) will. Hume gave
us a story as to how the empirical, psychological “substrate” we
share as humans generates likings that can be attuned to beauty
and the general good. What mechanism does Kant give to
explain how a “supersensible substrate” can function similarly?
Here Kant is, as befits his penetration as a philosopher, entirely
frank: he has no positive idea – the matter involves an “unfath-
omable depth of [a] supersensible power” (CJ 270; G ).
Note, however, that Kant is also clear that reason cannot oper-
ate here by argument alone:
. . . when in intuiting nature we expand our empirical power
of presentation (mathematically or dynamically [a “might over
the mind”]), then reason, the ability to [think] an indepen-
dent and absolute totality, never fails to step in and arouse the
mind to an effort, although a futile one . . . . . . . [W]e are com-
pelled to subjectively think nature itself in its totality as the
exhibition of something supersensible, without our being able
to bring this exhibition about objectively. 
. . . We cannot determine this idea of the supersensible any
further, and hence cannot cognize but can only think nature as
an exhibition of it. . . . This judging strains the imagination
because it is based on a feeling that the mind has a vocation
that wholly transcends the domain of nature (namely, moral
feeling), and it is with regard to this feeling that we judge the
presentation of the object subjectively purposive. [CJ 268]
Our mind, in its “supersensible vocation”, is here functioning in
a way Hume would have recognized despite the heavily Kantian
language: feeling and imagination are regulating judgment,
beyond the scope of cognition and argument alone. Within this
scheme, as within Hume’s, we may use arguments to help us
attain or correct a moral feeling or sentiment. For Kant, the
“contradiction in conception” and “contradiction in will” tests of
our practical maxims can place a purportedly good will face-to-
face with its potential own limitations, deflating or affirming its
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self-representation as perfectly general. For Hume, understand-
ing and general rules help to extend or correct untutored sym-
pathy. 
If reason’s functioning as a supersensible substrate for feeling
remains for Kant something of which he cannot give a positive
account, he nonetheless believes we can convince ourselves of its
possibility: we know from first-hand experience the “striking
down” of our pretenses and humiliating acknowledgement of our
own limitations, and we also know that reason alone among our
faculties possesses the qualities necessary for such experience – it
alone can furnish guidance that is impersonal. There is no mys-
tery about this when we confront the sublime in nature or moral-
ity. The peculiar awe we experience when we come upon “a
mountain whose snow-covered peak rises above the clouds” (OBS
47) or when we observe an act of genuine duty performed in
spite of conditions of extreme “subjective limitation”, has extra-
ordinary power to move us, yet cannot be attributed to empirical
sentiment. We find our own self-conceit “humiliated” or “struck
down” (CPrR 73) in the presence of the sublime. Fortunately, we
are not merely flattened. Instead, we are awakened to a value
“beyond price”, carried beyond ourselves for the moment to
sense a “direct liking”, a liking even of that which strikes at the
very heart of our own prideful self-interest. Thus it recruits our
fundamental allegiance, despite any personal interest to the con-
trary. 
To behold virtue in her proper shape is nothing other than to
show morality stripped of all admixture with the sensuous and
of all the spurious adornments of reward or self-love. How
much she then casts into the shade all else that appears attrac-
tive to the inclinations can be readily perceived by every man
if he will exert his reason in the slightest . . . . [G 61–62n] 
No wonder such a “presentation” moves us, and yields not the
“cold and lifeless approval, without any moving force or emotion”
(CJ 273, 274) that we would otherwise expect from any merely
un-self-interested presentation. Confronted with the sublime, we
are not tempted to think, “Yeah, but what’s it to me?” No wonder
such a “presentation” is regulative for our wills when we are ratio-
nal, i.e., attuned via our “supersensible substrate”. 
This has an important implication for our normative life
together: since it owes nothing to personal interest, our sense of
the sublime in nature and in conduct should be “subjectively”
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confirmable by other rational beings in their own experience.
Others, too, Kant is confident, will stand in awe before the Alps
during a storm or find that their mind bows when observing a
humble person doing his duty in the face of great temptation.
Our moral understanding, like our aesthetic understanding, will
be communicable to others in the form of a recommendation,
and it will afford a compelling ground for life together that con-
flicting individual interests do not. The compulsion here is not at
bottom that of will, or law, or rule, or consistency. Instead, it is a
kind of liking that is free but not simply chosen, and that is reg-
ulative for action. It is, then, our attitude when we are “mentally
attuned” by reason, and no mere submission – even though we
precisely recognize that it is not simply up to us what we make of
it. This is the experience of normative authority.
The rule-breaking considerations 
Duty belongs to a family of rule- or consistency-based notions.
And indeed we typically assume that morally good conduct will
follow rules and exhibit consistency. But if Kant is right, then
behind these rules – exceptionless, in his system – lies something
quite different: a kind of direct liking akin to the experience of
the sublime.  We do not have rules “all the way down”, but must
instead encounter a substantive appreciation of value and associ-
ated feelings. 
Hume was acutely aware of the potential this affords for con-
flict. If following “the rules of reason” led always to conclusions
that substantive evaluation and feeling also embraced, we’d have
no difficulty. But at least in epistemology, Hume finds that fol-
lowing the strictest epistemic duties, to accord epistemic respect
(“rational credence”, we might say) only to conclusions justifiable
by reason alone, leads him to an epistemic condition that he can-
not find stably credible or genuinely compelling in the guidance
of his overall epistemic life. Might the same be true in the moral
case? 
Consider Kant’s discussion of obedience to a tyrannical
ruler. 
. . . a people has a duty to put up with even what is held to be
an unbearable abuse of supreme authority [since] its resis-
tance to the highest legislation can never be regarded as other
than contrary to law . . . . For a people to be authorized to
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resist, there would have to be a public law permitting it to
resist, that is, the highest legislation would have to contain a
provision that is not the highest and that makes the people, as
subject, by one and the same judgment sovereign over him to
whom it is subject. This is self-contradictory . . . . [MM 320]21
Here Kant appeals to a consideration of consistency to ground a
claim of duty. And he has an excellent point, emphasized earlier
and in a characteristically different way by Hobbes: a sovereign
can benefit us by solving the problem of potentially unending
social conflict only if our agreement to obey does not contain a
clause reserving to each the right to decide on his own authority
when to obey. 
Hume, likewise, is aware that “the advantage we reap from gov-
ernment” will be imperilled if each allows himself to regulate his
own obedience in accord with his own ideas of what is just or
beneficial. The result could only be “endless confusion, and ren-
der all government, in a great measure, ineffectual” (T 555). “We
must, therefore, proceed by general rules and regulate ourselves
by general interests” (T 555). But how is it possible for advantage-
based duty to take on a life of its own?
. . . there is a principle of human nature, which we have fre-
quently taken notice of, that men are mightily addicted to gen-
eral rules, and that we often carry our maxims beyond those
reasons, which first adduc’d us to establish them. . . . It may,
therefore, be thought, that in the case of allegiance our moral
obligation of duty will not cease, even tho’ the natural obliga-
tion of interest, which is its cause, has ceas’d . . . . [T 551]
Hume, political conservative that he was, has here a golden
opportunity to embrace a Kant-like principle of passive obedi-
ence, and even continues “It may be thought that . . . men may
be bound by conscience to submit to a tyrannical government” (T
551). But he shrinks from this conclusion:
Those who took up arms against Dionysus or Nero, or Philip the
second, have the favour of every reader in the perusal of their
history; and nothing but the most violent perversion of com-
mon sense can ever lead us to condemn them. ‘Tis certain,
therefore, that in all our notions of morals we never entertain
such an absurdity as that of passive obedience, but make
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allowances for resistance in the more flagrant instances of
tyranny and oppression. [T 552]
How, then, does Hume block the unwanted conclusion of passive
obedience? What general rule or practical maxim does he for-
mulate for the citizen to follow to replace the rule of passive obe-
dience?  He offers none, only a general suggestion that “the
obligation to obedience must cease” when it sufficiently loses its
point, that is, “whenever the [common] interest ceases, in any
great degree, and in a considerable number of instances” (T
553). 
How, then, is this to work? “The common rule requires sub-
mission”, but “grievous tyranny and oppression” allows individu-
als to make “exceptions” (T 554). Here we have a discontinuous
change, a departure from own conscientious dispositions to obey
which “bind us down”, as we rise up in active resistance to gov-
ernment. It looks as if the chief mechanism that awakens us from
our “addiction” to general rules is a sympathetic sense of the vio-
lation of the general interest. Indeed, sympathy is strong enough
that, however much we dislike mayhem and disorder, our
approval is excited by rebellions against tyranny of which we hear
only in histories or fiction. A morality that would put a people at
the mercy of its rulers will not win our wholehearted admiration
or esteem. Here we follow no maxim or rule, but a developed
sentiment.
It is important to see, however, that the sentiment is developed.
Self-love and sympathy alone do not yield any comprehension of
when a complex political system is abusive or when such abuses
have become too considerable. Justly and unjustly inflicted pun-
ishment alike look and feel painful; just and unjust war alike are
costly and terrifying. An attunement to the general interest calls
for complex awareness of cause and effect, and of long- vs. short-
term, as well as sympathy for victims. Nonetheless, Hume’s
account is, in the Kantian sense, heteronomous, since it gives sen-
timents an essential role, and moreover it yields no strict maxim
that individual’s could legislate for themselves.22
NORMATIVE FORCE AND NORMATIVE FREEDOM 349
 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999
22 The difficulty of formulating a decision rule to be used by individuals here may be
a difficulty in principle. Whether it makes sense for you to disobey a tyrant, for example,
depends upon whether others will disobey, and their reasoning has a similar dependence
upon yours. Problems such as this may admit of general criteria for evaluation (such as a
standard of the general interest), but no decision rule or maxim that individuals can self-
legislate that would satisfy those criteria. For discussion, see Donald Regan, Utilitarianism
But, stepping back from a model of autonomy as maxim-based
self-legislation, if we reflect upon Hume’s position on passive obe-
dience vs. Kant’s, which of the two, in fact, seems to provide
greater practical or political autonomy? Which affords us, as citi-
zens or as moral agents, greater scope to deploy and act on the
full range of our human critical faculties? 
Suppose Kant were to abandon his egoistic hedonism about
human psychology and accept instead the Humean view that sen-
timents can help attune us to be attuned to legitimate grounds
for moral, aesthetic, or epistemic evaluation. Would he still insist
that our only hope for genuinely moral, aesthetic, or epistemic
conduct – or autonomy – lies in imposing over sentiment a
regime of exceptionless rules?
Of course, I cannot answer on Kant’s behalf, but I can
attempt this: apply Kant’s own test of fundamental normative
authority, and see where it might lead. How is this possible?
Kant’s test, recall, involves a special sort of first-personal con-
firmation: when (for example) we confront the humble man
who insists on being honest despite personal costs that we real-
ize would likely overwhelm us, “the mind bows”; when we
attend perceptually to sublime scenes in nature, we cannot
help but be awed.
Return now to the tyrannical ruler and the obedient citizenry,
who accept without resistance all forms of abuse and humiliation.
Does “ordinary reason” (G 394) find passive obedience to tyran-
ny sublime – does the mind indeed bow?  
I’m willing to bet with Hume that in this case it does not.
Impressive as the spectacle may be of passive obedience in the
face of great abuse, and powerful as the will must be to restrain
an individual feeling the tugs of inclination to strike back at
the tyrant, does our mind really bow before this sight? Suppose
that the peculiar abuse by government is an order to inform on
our friends, to reveal their location to an authority whose plan
is to eliminate or torture dissidents or religious minorities. It
seems, perhaps, that we know Kant’s answer: obey authority;
never lie, even to conceal a friend (cf. SRL). And this is the sort
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of example that has often enough been used by critics of Kant as
a reductio of his conception of the ground of morality.
But Kant deserves better treatment. Those of us who find in
Kant’s writings a deep insight into the authority of moral experi-
ence should not betray this insight by allowing critics to focus
instead on his attempts to apply a multi-layered theory in prac-
tice, mediated by a defective empirical psychology. His applica-
tion may go wrong in cases like “passive obedience”, but the fun-
damentals may yet be sound. 
At the fundamental level, I suspect, our mind simply does not
bow at the spectacle of the citizen who, despite strong ties of fam-
ily and friendship, reveals their location to a tyrannical authority.
Such an act of will may be monumental, but it is not majestic, and
even seems to us peculiarly self-contained or blind. Can we
attribute this response on our part to self-interest? No, the
response seems to be the same even when we consider a case
from history or fiction. Is it then merely an unconsidered reflex?
No, Hume is right that our initial reaction to disobedience is usu-
ally discomfort. But we reflect further. The deep normative dis-
tress we feel when Germany’s greatest moral philosopher defends
the unalterable necessity of obedience to the state, and the
exceptionless duty never to lie to conceal the location of a friend,
is an impersonal and historical shudder. It arises from the full
range of Humean faculties, developed through experience: rea-
son, imagination, sense, sympathy, memory, and a feeling for
one’s place in history.  
How different our reaction when we learn that Kant failed on
one notable occasion to keep to his habit of regular afternoon
walks – the afternoon he received Rousseau’s Emile, and would
not put it down. We might be less impressed by the iron will of
Kant upon hearing this story, but we are more impressed by the
man and his mind. 
Let us conclude with a thought experiment using Kant’s own
division of the “three different relations that presentations have
to the feeling of pleasure”, namely, the agreeable, the beautiful, and
the good, to understand our reactions and their normative force
(CJ 210).
Suppose we had learned that Kant missed his afternoon walk
only once, but not to read Emile – rather, to avoid a pesky visitor
to town whom he knew to be lurking in wait for him with an
embarrassing question he preferred not to answer. As a result we
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might like Kant better – he would be more amiable for showing
this human tendency to indulge a desire to avoid an uncomfort-
able truth. But our self-conceit would not be struck down by this
realization – instead, we would find it gratifying to our sense of
ourselves that even Kant could be self-indulgent when it comes to
allowing oneself to side-step an awkward truth. This we would
find agreeable, but not in an altogether admiring way. Especially,
the critic who finds Kantian moral rigorism excessive would smile
inwardly, with perhaps a touch of condescension.
Suppose instead we had learned that he missed his afternoon
walk on that one occasion in order to avoid spoiling the end of
lovely afternoon tea with a visitor whom Kant rarely saw but per-
sonally admired. Then we would like the act, and also Kant, yet
better. Moreover, we would like him and his act impersonally as
well as personally – for someone to break from routine or per-
sonal resolution for such a reason shows a kind of gracefulness
or beauty of gesture. Even those Kantian critics who find it grat-
ifying to view him as a cold, “clockwork” Prussian would be
taken a bit aback, and find a bit of appreciation of Kant creep-
ing in. 
But when we learn that in fact Kant missed his afternoon walk
but once, in order to continue reading Rousseau’s Emile –
Rousseau! whose unruly mind, scandalous conduct, and color-
fully inconsistent prose contrast so sharply with Kant’s, but
whose insights we know nonetheless reached to the core of
Kant’s thinking – we like this because it possesses something of
the sublime. And we like Kant better, impersonally as well as
personally, for showing in a concrete but dramatically appro-
priate way just how attuned he was to the insights that awaited
him in Rousseau, how capable he was of being displaced from
the ruts the mind is wont to settle into. We here find in both
Kant and his mind something good, something estimable in its
own right. That afternoon’s display of “mental attunement” is
much more impressive than would be the strength of will, con-
sistency, or resistance to inclination that Kant would have exhib-
ited had he instead overcome the desire to continue reading
Emile and maintained above all a resolve to take an afternoon
walk each day, exactly at the same time. Thus does Kant’s omis-
sion strike a bit at the self-conceit of critics who might attempt
to look upon him with intellectual condescension as hermetic,
narrowly moralistic, trapped within his own technical language
and scheme of categories. For when we appreciate this story, we
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cannot help but feel, freely, a kind of admiration for Kant as an
intellect. And thus does the experience of normativity combine
force and freedom.23
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